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“A HORRIBLE FASCINATION”: 
SEGREGATION, OBSCENITY, AND THE CULTURAL CONTINGENCY OF RIGHTS 
 
 
ANDERS WALKER♦ 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Building on current interest in the regulation of child pornography, this 
article goes back to the 1950s, recovering a lost history of how southern 
segregationists used the battle against obscenity to counter the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Brown v. Board of Education.  Itself focused on the 
psychological development of children, Brown sparked a discursive 
backlash in the South focused on claims that the races possessed different 
cultures and that white children would be harmed joined a larger, regional 
campaign, a constitutional guerilla war mounted by moderates and 
extremists alike that swept onto cultural, First Amendment terrain even as 
the frontal assault of massive resistance succumbed to federal might.  A 
radical re-reading of prevailing understandings of southern resistance to 
Brown, this article posits that civil rights proved much more culturally 
contingent than scholars have so far recognized, reframing the manner in 
which we understand Brown, its progeny, and current constitutional 
debates over the relationship between rights and race.  
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“A HORRIBLE FASCINATION”: 
SEX, SEGREGATION, AND THE LOST POLITICS OF OBSCENITY 
 
 
 
ANDERS WALKER♦ 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  During the summer of 1959, Virginia newspaper editor James 
Jackson Kilpatrick adopted the alias “Billy Williams” and began 
purchasing large quantities of pornography through the mail.1  While 
Kilpatrick was himself a married father of three with a respectable address 
on Hanover Avenue in Richmond, Billy was “a twenty-three-year-old 
bakery salesman, a high-school graduate, interested in dirty pictures, dirty 
movies, [and] sexy correspondence.”2  Within weeks, Billy’s inquiries led 
to a flood of obscene material, including an offer “to buy action films from 
Copenhagen.”3  Inspired, Kilpatrick generated a second fictive persona, 
“Joseph Rocco,” “an effeminate, fruity sort of character, devoted to 
bondage pictures, male nudes, [and] the more delicate and bizarre forms of 
erotica.”4   
 Kilpatrick’s pornographic personae marked a dramatic departure 
from the man that most Virginians knew him to be, a loyal supporter of 
arch-conservative Senator Harry Flood Byrd, and one of the South’s 
foremost advocates of massive resistance to Brown v. Board of 
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2
 JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SMUT PEDDLERS 11 (1960). 
3
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Education.5  Since 1955 – a year after the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision – Kilpatrick had used his newspaper, the Richmond News-Leader, 
platform-fashion to criticize the ruling.6  In editorial after editorial, he 
blasted Brown as a violation of states’ rights, celebrated Senator Byrd’s 
call for “massive resistance,” and even “revived” an eighteenth century 
theory of constitutional defiance known as “interposition.”7  The doctrine 
of interposition held  that states could reject federal authority whenever 
they believed “that authority violated the Constitution,” a notion rooted in 
Madisonian opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.8. By 1957, 
almost every southern state had adopted interposition as either official or 
symbolic policy, making Kilpatrick one of the single-most important 
architects of southern opposition to the Supreme Court.9  
 How, if at all, did Williams and Rocco fit into this picture?  Were 
there ties between Kilpatrick’s views of Brown and his views of prominent 
1950s Supreme Court obscenity cases like Kingsley v. Regents and Roth v. 
United States?10  Or, was it mere coincidence that he began to develop 
fictive alter-egos interested in pornography at the very same time that he 
led the South’s legal charge against civil rights?  A letter penned by 
Kilpatrick on January 7, 1960 provides a clue.  “All this is now futile,” he 
began, writing to Virginia state representative Edward Lane.11  Though 
“the interposition movement of four years ago had great political value … 
[y]ou know what happened since then as well as I … [t]he full power and 
weight of the Federal judiciary have been thrown into enforcement of the 
doctrines laid down generally in Brown v. Board of Education, and the 
impact of that decision no longer can be avoided.”12 Rather than continue 
massive resistance, argued Kilpatrick, the South needed to change tactics, 
to “do what the repeal forces did in the early 1920’s” to end Prohibition, 
                                                 
5
 Garret Epps, The Littlest Rebel: James J. Kilpatrick and the Second Civil War, 10 
CONST. COMMENT. 19 (1993); JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SOVEREIGN STATES: 
NOTES OF A CITIZEN OF VIRGINIA (1957); JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SOUTHERN 
CASE FOR SCHOOL SEGREGATION (1962).  
6
 RICHMOND NEWS LEADER, INTERPOSITION: EDITORIALS AND EDITORIAL PAGE 
PRESENTATIONS (1956); NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE 
AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S 129 (1997). 
7
 DAVID L. CHAPPELL, A STONE OF HOPE: PROPHETIC RELIGION AND THE DEATH OF JIM 
CROW 168 (2004); NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND 
POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S 129 (1997).  
8
 DAVID L. CHAPPELL, A STONE OF HOPE: PROPHETIC RELIGION AND THE DEATH OF JIM 
CROW 168 (2004). 
9
 NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE 
SOUTH DURING THE 1950S 129, 131 (1997).  See also, MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM 
CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL 
EQUALITY (2004).  
10
 Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 
(1957).  
11
 James Jackson Kilpatrick to Edward E. Lane, Jan. 7, 1960, Folder: L 1960, Box 31, 
Acc. No. 6626-b, James Jackson Kilpatrick Papers, Special Collections, University of 
Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.  
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namely “labor unceasingly to create a climate of opinion nationally in 
which the decision itself, if not actually reversed, will be effectively 
modified or controlled by acts of Congress.”13  This called not for “foolish 
and useless laws,” concluded Kilpatrick, but “propaganda, publicity, and 
education.”14 
 It was a new turn, and one that helped explain Kilpatrick’s sudden 
interest in obscenity – a topic that he declared held a “horrible fascination” 
for him.15  As this article will demonstrate, Kilpatrick wove threads of 
interposition into The Smut Peddlers, using the battle against pornography 
to build a new coalition, one determined to prevent the Supreme Court 
from wresting further power from the states, this time under the rubric of 
upholding morality – itself a front for undermining civil rights.   Rather 
than a quixotic, one-man quest, Kilpatrick’s turn to prudence joined a 
larger, regional campaign, a constitutional guerilla war mounted by 
moderates and extremists alike that swept onto cultural, First Amendment 
terrain even as the frontal assault of massive resistance succumbed to 
federal might.  Dubious moral regulations emerged across the region, 
southern officials declared the need to reinvigorate decency, and land 
bridges between the South and the nation began to surface, particularly as 
civil rights protest devolved into urban riots in 1965.   
 Animating this shift was a pervading sense that the civil rights 
movement had to be engaged on its own terms, not with violence or vitriol 
but moral rhetoric and aspirational politics.  Just as movement leaders like 
Martin Luther King, Jr. extolled black heroism and disciplined non-
violence, so too did segregationists like Kilpatrick feel compelled to 
celebrate the best of the white South; its civility, its manners, and its 
paternalist concern for African Americans who, of course, segregationists 
then painted as illegitimate, immoral, and inept.  If successful, Kilpatrick 
hoped to undermine the persuasive power of black leaders like King, 
meanwhile winning national support for the struggle against Brown.  
However, accomplishing such a task involved a delicate cultural politics.  
On the one hand, white officials aimed to delegitimate civil rights by 
increasing moral regulations of extra-marital sex, common law marriage, 
and illegitimacy – essentially reframing black culture as pathological – 
meanwhile recasting white southerners as morally principled arbiters of 
decency, a move reinforced by a sudden interest in the seemingly non-race 
related subject of pornography.   
 To illustrate, this article will proceed in five parts.  Part I will 
recover the first signs of a cultural backlash to Brown in the South, 
showing how segregationists feared the ruling’s effect on the 
indoctrination of racial prejudice in white youth, even as they seized on 
the opinion’s social science evidence to forge a statistically constructed 
moralist response.  Part II will show how said response bled onto legal 
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terrain, sparking a web of regulations on marriage, adoption, and 
illegitimacy, all aimed at preserving segregation through coded, legislative 
means.  Part III shows how segregationists applied these means to the 
national framework, looking both to bridge southern interests with voters 
in the North and West, even positing amendments to the United States 
Constitution under the rubric of controlling pornography.  Part IV reveals 
the manner in which such discursive moves intersected with the direct 
action phase of the civil rights movement, prompting a series of exchanges 
between black activists and white segregationists on the explicitly cultural 
terrains of language, dress, and literature.  Finally, Part V recovers the 
constitutional implications of these intersections, first through victories 
against illegitimacy, and then a surprising right-hand turn on the Supreme 
Court.  
 What lessons do we learn from such an inquiry?  First, though 
legal historians have tended to portray southern resistance to Brown in 
terms of massive resistance, such readings only scratch the surface of 
segregationist strategy in the 1950s and 60s.16  Second, while southern 
historians like David Chappell argue that the white South failed to develop 
a Christian response to the prophetic religion of the Civil Rights 
Movement, a close look at segregationist turns to moral regulations 
indicates that segregationists did in fact assemble such a response, though 
not one articulated in prophetic terms.17  Rather than invoke prophetic 
religion, segregationist turned to a discourse of personal morality, one that 
proved particularly insidious precisely because it merged Puritanical 
notions of sexual sin with longstanding presumptions that the law should 
in fact be used to control such sin, even if no harm was involved.18  Even 
scholars who take segregationist religion seriously have missed this point, 
arguing instead that southern whites became preoccupied with 
“proclaiming the end of time and the irrelevance of life in the flesh.”19   
 Rather than consider life in the flesh irrelevant, segregationists 
worked hard to link Evangelical notions of personal purity with 
conservative fears of delinquency, pornography, and the corruption of 
minors more generally, laying the foundations for a discourse that would 
come to win popular support through the end of the Twentieth Century.20  
                                                 
16
 See e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 385-442 (2004). 
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 DAVID L. CHAPPELL, A STONE OF HOPE: PROPHETIC RELIGION AND THE DEATH OF JIM 
CROW 5 (2004).  
18
 Lord Devlin, Law, Democracy, and Morality, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 636 (1962).  
19
 Jane Dailey, Sex, Segregation, and the Sacred after Brown, 91 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN 
HISTORY 119, 121 (2004). 
20
 Whitney Strub, Perversion for Profit: Citizens for Decent Literature and the Arousal of 
the Antiporn Public in the 1960s 15 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 258, 260, 
291 (2006) (noting that “[p]ornography remained central to the New Right’s moral 
outrage” into the 1980s); Whitney Strub, Black and White and Banned All Over: Race, 
Censorship, and Obscenity in Postwar Memphis 40 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL HISTORY 703 
(2007) (showing how segregationists in Memphis turned to “moralistic fervor” in the 
struggle against civil rights).  See also CHRIS HEDGES, AMERICAN FASCISTS: THE 
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Indeed, the significance of segregationist turns to personal morality lay 
precisely in their ability to appeal across regional lines, transforming the 
struggle against Brown into a decidedly cultural crusade for the 
preservation of personal, moral values and Christian virtue.21 
 That obscenity became entangled in this project is worth noting.  
Even today, attitudes toward obscenity differ significantly based on 
whether the targets are children or adults, a phenomenon exemplified in 
the current disconnect between prosecutions of minors for “sexting”; 
contrasted with the constitutional protection of adult-makers of “crush” 
videos involving the torture of animals.22  Now, as then, prosecutions for 
pornography seem to be animated more by an interest in monitoring 
children than ending exploitation or cruelty, a concern that assumed a 
bizarrely sinister guise during the struggle for civil rights.   
 Further, documenting segregationist moves to pornography 
broadens our understanding not simply of southern resistance to civil 
rights, but what scholars Paul Brest, Sanford Levison, Jack Balkin, Akhil 
Amar, and Reva Siegel call the “processes of Constitutional decision-
making.”23  Interested in the role that “other political institutions” besides 
the Court play in Constitutional interpretation, Brest and company limit 
their discussion of segregationist reactions to Brown to “The Southern 
Manifesto,” a document pledging that the South will use “all lawful 
means” to combat the ruling.24  Missing, however, is any discussion of 
what, precisely, those legal means were, how they aimed to curry popular 
opinion against the Court, and how they carried the constitutional struggle 
for racial equality onto explicitly cultural terrain – terrain that raises 
questions about the cultural contingency of rights generally in the United 
States. 
 Put simply, the terrain of culture became a lost front in the struggle 
for racial equality at mid-Century.25 The end of segregation, this article 
will demonstrate, created fears across the South not simply of racial 
                                                                                                                                                 
CHRISTIAN RIGHT AND THE WAR ON AMERICA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006); 
JOHN C. GREEN, ET AL., THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: MARCHING TO 
THE MILLENIUM (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2003); Marshall 
Frady, Billy Graham: A Parable of American Righteousness (1979, New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2006); RONALD J. SIDER & DIANE KNIPPERS, TOWARD AN EVANGELICAL 
PUBLIC POLICY: POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR THE HEALTH OF A NATION (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Books, 2005).  
21
 Id.  
22
 Rethinking Sex Offender Laws for Youths Showing Off Online, N.Y. TIMES, March 21, 
2010, A1; Justices Overturn Anti-animal Cruelty Law, WASHINGTON POST, April 21, 
2010, A3; Crush Animal Cruelty; The Next Step is Up to Congress, WASHINGTON POST, 
April 25, 2010, A21.   
23
 PAUL BREST, ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (5th ed., 2006).  
24
 PAUL BREST, ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 904 (5th ed., 
2006). 
25
 The idea that the realm of culture can be implicated in political struggle is nothing new.  
For an early exposition of the relationship between culture and political conflict, see 
ANTONIO GRAMSCI, THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (1929).  
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integration, but social, moral, and sexual disorder, particularly among 
youth.  Public officials responded to such fears by pushing for increased 
legal regulation of both the public and private spheres, including marriage, 
adoption, and illegitimacy.  For segregationists like Kilpatrick, such 
regulations of culture promised a salve for social insecurities generated by 
Brown, even as they posed a potential threat to the cultural claims inherent 
in white supremacy.  If the region pushed too far in the area of cultural 
control, feared Kilpatrick, it would risk appearing backward and philistine, 
undermining racist arguments that southern whites were culturally 
superior to blacks.  Critical to the South’s chances at preserving 
segregation, in other words, was carving out a constitutional and cultural 
defense of Jim Crow that voters across the country could endorse.  
Consequently, Kilpatrick became deeply involved not simply in the legal 
struggle over civil rights, but also a larger, literary struggle over the 
cultural implications of recognizing those rights.  
 
  
   
 
I. THE ‘UNPREJUDICED’ MIND 
 
 Long before James Jackson Kilpatrick shifted his attention from 
interposition to pornography, segregationist voices called for a moral 
crusade against civil rights.  Among the first to do so was Mississippi 
Judge Thomas Pickens Brady, a staunch segregationist who traveled from 
his home in Brookhaven, Mississippi to nearby Greenwood to deliver a 
talk in late May 1954.26  Later distributed by segregationists across the 
South, Brady’s talk posited that desegregation would quickly lead to 
interracial sex.27  “Constantly,” argued Brady, “the [N]egro will be 
endeavoring to usurp every right and privilege which will lead to 
intermarriage.”28 Such arguments, as historians have shown, were not only 
common in the post-Brown South but coincided with prohibitions against 
interracial marriage dating back at least two hundred years.29   
                                                 
26
 NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE 
SOUTH DURING THE 1950S, 85 (1997).  
27
 For the influence of Brady’s speech on massive resistance, see NUMAN V. BARTLEY, 
THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 
1950S 85 (1999).  
28
 THOMAS PICKENS BRADY, BLACK MONDAY (Greenwood: Association of Citizens’ 
Councils (1954). 
29
 PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING 
OF RACE IN AMERICA 19, 225-26 (2009) (discussing the history of miscegenation law 
generally, and arguments that integration would lead to miscegenation in Mississippi 
specifically). See also, Julie Novkov, Racial Constructions: The Legal Regulation of 
Miscegenation in Alabama, 1890-1934 20 LAW & HISTORY REV. 225 (2002); Martha 
Hodes, The Sexualization of American Politics: White Women and Black Men in the 
South after the Civil War 3 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 402 (1993; 
MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK MEN: ILLICIT SEX IN THE NINETEENTH-
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 Yet, woven through Brady’s intermarriage claim were strange 
threads, hints not simply that integration might encourage illicit sex, a 
common fear, but that integration might actually prevent children from 
developing race prejudice.30  “[Y]ou cannot place little white and [N]egro 
children together in classrooms and not have integration,” asserted Brady, 
“[t]hey will grow up together and the sensitivity of the white children will 
be dulled.”31  Brady’s mention of sensitivity indicated that racism was 
something that had to be inculcated in youth, a refinement of sorts that 
children did not naturally possess. Others agreed.  Writing for the Atlantic 
Monthly in 1956, South Carolina journalist Herbert Ravenal Sass declared 
that “the elementary public school” had to remain segregated “at all costs” 
because white youth possessed “unprejudiced” minds.32  “[R]ace 
preference is not active in the very young,” warned Sass, but was rather 
“one of those instincts which develop gradually as the mind develops and 
which, if taken in hand early enough, can be prevented from developing at 
all.”33   
 Not all segregationists framed their fear of integration in terms of 
eroding prejudice.  Some spoke of harm.  “I submit that white children 
also have rights,” proclaimed Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland only 
weeks after Brown was handed down.34  “[T]ensions and frictions 
generally found in an interracial school,” continued Eastland, “certainly 
will have a bad effect on a white child, and in my judgment will interfere 
with the white child’s ability to learn.”35  South Carolina journalist 
William D. Workman echoed Eastland’s concerns in a book defending Jim 
                                                                                                                                                 
CENTURY SOUTH (1997); JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCEENATION AND 
MULATTOES IN THE UNITED STATES (1993);  See also KEVIN MUMFORD, INTERZONES: 
BLACK/WHITE SEX DISTRICTS IN CHICAGO AND NEW YORK IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (1997); Phoebe Godfrey, Bayonets, Brainwashing, and Bathrooms: The 
Discourse of Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Desegregation of Little Rock’s Central 
High, 62 ARKANSAS HISTORICAL QUARTERLY 42 (2003).   
30
 Scholars of children in the South have not recognized the extent to which even staunch 
segregationists like Brady realized race prejudice was artificially inculcated in youth.  
See, e.g. REBECCA DE SCHWEINITZ, IF WE COULD CHANGE THE WORLD: YOUNG PEOPLE 
AND AMERICA’S LONG STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2009); Notions that white 
children had to be educated on the ideology of race were nothing new.  Colonial elites in 
places as distant as British South Africa and the Dutch East Indies struggled incessantly 
with the challenge of European children abandoning European ways, leading to an entire 
discourse on the proper training, or education, of white youth, discourses that prefigured 
white concerns in the American South during the 1950s.  Ann Laura Stoler, Sexual 
Affronts and Racial Frontiers, in TENSIONS OF EMPIRE: COLONIAL CULTURES IN A 
BOURGEOIS WORLD 215 (Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds, 1997); ANN 
LAURA STOLER, THE EDUCATION OF DESIRE: FOUCAULT’S HISTORY OF SEXUALITY AND 
THE COLONIAL ORDER OF THINGS 105 (1995).   
31
 Id.  at 65.  
32
 Herbert Ravenal Sass, Mixed Schools and Mixed Blood, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 
1956, 18, 19. 
33
 Herbert Ravenal Sass, Mixed Schools and Mixed Blood, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 
1956, 18.  
34
 James O. Eastland, Congressional Record – Senate, July 23, 1954, 11523. 
35
 Id.  
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Crow.  “[T]he integrationists, who cry for racial admixture in the cause of 
bolstering the personality development of a Negro minority,” complained 
Workman, “do not hesitate to compel the mingling of a white minority 
with a black majority without any consideration of the inevitable 
psychological impact upon the personalities of the white children.  Indeed, 
there has been monumental indifference on the part of the race-mixers 
concerning the likelihood of adverse psychological effects upon white 
children.”36 
 Exacerbating southern interest in “psychological effects” was 
Brown’s own reasoning which cited social science data to establish that 
segregated schools violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, not simply because schools were unequal, but because racial 
separation per se inflicted psychological harm on black youth.37  Georgia 
Attorney General Eugene Cook lamented the fact that, in his view, “the 
justices based their decision not upon any premise or tenet of law, but 
solely upon sociological and psychological theories.”38  South Carolina 
Senator Olin D. Johnston agreed, noting that when he “became a United 
States Senator … [he] took an oath to support and defend the Constitution 
of the United States” but this did not include supporting “sociological 
pronouncements of a Supreme Court” that replaced law with arbitrary 
“judicial dictatorship.”39 
Outrage at the Court’s reliance on social science data convinced 
some segregationists, including James Jackson Kilpatrick, that outright 
defiance or “massive resistance” to the Court was the South’s best hope, 
prompting him to launch a legal campaign of “interposition” from his desk 
                                                 
36
 WILLIAM D. WORKMAN, THE CASE FOR THE SOUTH (1960), 241.  
37
 Even northern sources commented on the Court’s reliance on social psychology.  
“Relying more on the social scientists than on legal precedents – a procedure often in 
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See generally, DARRYL MICHAEL SCOTT, CONTEMPT & PITY: SOCIAL POLICY AND THE 
IMAGE OF THE DAMAGED BLACK PSYCHE, 1880-1996 (1997).  
38
 53 NAACP Heads Reds, Says Cook: Georgia Attorney General Talks at N.O. Rally, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), March 21, 1956, p. 3. 
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According to the Florida legislature, the Supreme Court had “cited as authority for the 
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FLORIDA, 1956. 
9 
 
in Richmond.40  First devised by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison in 
response to the oppressive Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, the doctrine 
of interposition held that it was “the unquestionable right” of individual 
states to resist unconstitutional federal action.  Though not quite as 
dramatic as armed revolt, the theory nevertheless held that states could 
interpose their will against the Supreme Court, a proposition that flirted 
with outright rejection of the federal government.  Yet, Kilpatrick viewed 
it – at the time – to be a genteel means of refuting Brown.41  Indeed, to his 
mind, interposition represented a bridge issue, a non-objectionable concept 
that the South might use to relate to the rest of the country, perhaps even 
currying national favor.  “[T]he fate of the schools,” argued Kilpatrick in 
1957, for example, “is not the most vital issue here at bar.  Far 
transcending any question of race or instruction, is the greater conflict 
over the stability of the Constitution . . . If States outside the South are to 
comprehend the peril before them,” he continued, “they would do well to 
look beyond the frontal fight of Brown v. Board of Education to the 
flanking decisions in which State powers also are being steadily 
destroyed.”42  Kilpatrick went on to discuss a series of “flanking” cases, 
all decided by the Supreme Court that increased the power of the federal 
government over the states.  Among them were United States v. California 
and United States v. Louisiana, both declaring the federal government sole 
owner of “the land, minerals and other things of value” off the coasts of 
California and Louisana.43  Also indicative of federal creep were Garner 
v. Teamsters Union, dismissing state remedies for labor disputes, and 
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, overturning state convictions of suspected 
communists.44  Such rulings, argued Kilpatrick represented a frightening 
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campaign by the federal government to rob the states of their sovereignty.  
Protecting that sovereignty, not preserving white supremacy, constituted 
the South’s ultimate reason for rejecting the Supreme Court. 
Impressed, segregationists across the South adopted interposition 
as either official or symbolic policy, making it a pronounced component of 
the larger campaign of massive resistance to Brown.45  Yet, interposition 
was not the only strategy pursued by southern states.46  Across the South, 
moderates proclaimed that Brown could be circumvented through other, 
more subtle means.47  In Florida, Governor LeRoy Collins warned that 
pursuing a course of “hot words” would only jeopardize the South’s 
position, and that “smart lawyers” could find “lawful and peaceful means” 
to circumvent the ruling.48  Mississippi Governor J.P. Coleman agreed, 
warning that “[w]e can’t preserve segregation by defying the federal 
government,” but rather, the South needed to employ “legal means” to 
subvert the decision.49   
What kind of means?  Coleman developed a model for 
circumventing Brown that states across the South emulated, one that 
focused on removing all mention of race from southern state law, 
meanwhile using coded signifiers to assign students to schools.50 Called 
“pupil placement,” Coleman developed this plan while listening to oral 
arguments in Brown, months before the case was decided.51  The strategy 
hinged on using social science evidence, particularly illegitimacy rates, to 
assign students to schools based on “public health,” and “morals.”52  As 
the next section will show, such “pupil placement plans” spread across the 
South, sparking a wave of related, moral regulations aimed at preserving 
Jim Crow.53  
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II. MORAL REGULATIONS 
 
Coleman’s endorsement of pupil placement as a “legal means” of 
circumventing Brown marked a distinctly different form of resistance than 
constitutional defiance, or interposition, a strategy that quickly implicated 
other laws.  For example, in 1956 Coleman signed a bill into law that 
abolished common law marriage, hoping to boost black illegitimacy rates 
and “aid segregation by permitting the state to segregate on a basis of 
‘unfavorable moral background’ instead of race.”54  The “theory of the 
bill,” reported the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate “was to set up 
unfavorable moral background as a basis for segregation,” a background 
measured entirely by focusing on illegitimacy rates.55  Of course, in citing 
such rates segregationists did not bother to mention whether they may 
have been artificially suppressed in white communities through either 
abortions or adoptions, a recurring practice according to the Virginia 
League of Local Welfare Executives, who argued that adoptions were 
facilitated by whites-only maternity homes and abortions handled “by the 
girls themselves or their families with no call on the taxpayers.”56  The “10 
per cent” of pregnancies that befell women on welfare, consequently, were 
“the ones that produce the cries of alarm,” and those tended – due to Jim 
Crow’s devastating impact on education, economic opportunity, and 
political power – to be black. 57 
Yet, segregationists turned a blind eye to adoptions and abortions 
in white communities, preferring instead to argue that “[southern whites] 
are the only people in America who can testify to … the low moral level 
of the Colored in marriage relationships.”58 According to the Virginia 
Methodist Advocate, opposition to integration could be explained by the 
“different moral standards” between the races, standards reflected in 
“illegitimate births.”59  A Mississippi source agreed, holding that “[n]ot 
more than 20 per cent of the Negroes are married … if you will pick out 
ten Negro families and check the records, you will find that not over two 
of them are actually legitimately married.”60   
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The emphasis on marriage rates as a justification for segregation, 
together with the use of marriage, or extra-marital motherhood as a means 
of perpetuating it, helps to explain a wave of laws enacted across the 
South in the 1950s that made marriage licenses increasingly difficult to 
obtain.  To take just a few examples, Mississippi enacted several bills in 
1956 “designed to throw up a bulwark around the state’s segregation 
laws,” including not only its ban on common law marriage but also a 
requirement that all marriage licenses provide information on the 
applicants, including their race, number of past marriages, and manner of 
termination of past marriages.61  Further, the bill required that all data be 
sent to the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the State Board of Health, a 
measure that insured the new data would be tabulated.62  That same year, 
Georgia declared that marriage licenses could only be granted by the 
registrar, or his clerk, at the county courthouse, between the hours of 8 
A.M. and 12 P.M.63 As an accommodation to working people, the act 
declared that the clerk of court could also grant licenses at his personal 
residence, no doubt a provision that catered to whites – who were 
undoubtedly more comfortable approaching white homes after hours than 
African Americans.64  One year later, Georgia further complicated the 
process of requiring a marriage license by declaring that the dissolution of 
previous marriages would no longer be presumed when an individual 
applied for a marriage license.65  Instead, the applicant carried the burden 
of proving that any prior marriages had been legitimately dissolved via 
divorce.66  For those who did happen to be in a common law marriage, 
such a measure made the prospect of remarrying significantly harder, if 
not impossible.67   
In 1957, North Carolina required that all newborns be registered 
within five days of birth with the Central Office of Vital Statistics and that 
a birth certificate be obtained for each child.68  Further, information 
regarding the marital status of parents was to be included on each birth 
certificate, meanwhile each certificate was then to be sent to the Central 
Office of Vital Statistics, presumably for tabulation purposes.69  The 
significance of birth certificates assumed an even more pronounced role in 
Arkansas, where “no child” was “admitted to the first grade of any public 
school of the state until the parent, guardian, or some other responsible 
person has presented to the proper authorities such child’s birth 
certificate.”70 Louisiana passed a similar rule, holding that “all children, 
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upon entering the first grade of any school in the State of Louisiana shall 
be required to present a copy of their official birth record to the school 
principal.”71  Meanwhile, Louisiana passed a law that required individuals 
applying for a marriage license to present certified copies of their original 
birth certificates – along with medical documents dated within ten days of 
the license application asserting that neither applicant was a carrier of 
venereal disease.72 
Though such regulations coincided with a larger effort to 
document differences in “moral background” between the races, questions 
emerged about how, precisely, whites were to escape such statistical nets.  
This became apparent in North Carolina in 1959, when two state 
legislators proposed a bill granting district attorneys the power to 
prosecute unwed mothers for child abandonment.  According to the 
proposal, district attorneys would be provided with lists of illegitimate 
births and would be required to investigate the parents responsible for 
such births.73  D.A.’s would also receive lists of Aid to Dependent 
Children (ADC) recipients and be required to investigate them for similar 
violations.74  If the prosecutors happened to find that unwed parents were 
misusing funds, they could charge them with a misdemeanor.75 
Immediately, cries emerged from North Carolina’s white 
community, particularly that portion of the community which dealt with 
white adoptions.76  On May 12, 1959, for example, Galt Braxton, a 
member of the Board of Trustees of the Children’s Home Society of 
Greensboro, wrote to the chair of the House Health Committee 
complaining that the bill made for bad policy.77  In particular, he 
complained of the requirement that prosecutors be supplied with the 
names and addresses of illegitimate children and their unwed mothers.  
“Such a law,” argued Braxton would “brand” every “innocent child born 
in North Carolina out of wedlock as illegitimate.”78  Rather than reduce 
illegitimacy rates, this “would defeat efforts that have been in progress for 
more than half a century to save such innocent youngsters by placing them 
in reputable and proper homes.”79  Not only that, but the bill “would brand 
every young woman in the State who unfortunately becomes an unwed 
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mother and would put up the bars permanently for such a girl or young 
woman to be redeemed to society and thereafter live a life worthwhile.”80 
Given that North Carolina boasted few maternity homes for blacks, 
Braxton’s message clearly aimed to alert the legislature to possible harm 
the bill might cause whites.81  Further, Braxton’s concern that whites be 
“redeemed” from their pre-marital affairs underscores the extent to which 
southern invocations of morality proved only a partial substitute for color 
as a basis for discrimination.  Yet, this did not stop states from continuing 
the project of using moral signifiers as vehicles for furthering repression.  
To take just a few of the most outrageous examples, in 1958 Georgia 
passed a voter registration act that enabled voters to register in two 
different ways.82  Either they could read and write intelligibly a section of 
the state or national constitution, or they could exhibit good character and 
an understanding of the duties of citizenship by responding to a set of 
questions.83  Due to persistent illiteracy caused by Jim Crow, most black 
applicants chose to answer the questions despite the fact that the majority 
of them were disqualified.84 Florida writer Stetson Kennedy commented 
on these disqualifications, noting that arbitrary determinations of moral 
character were often involved.85 “The purge procedure as evolved by 
Georgia is simplicity itself,” argued Kennedy “You receive a legal 
summons to appear before the county board of registrars at a specified 
time … to ‘show cause’ why your name should not be dropped because of 
‘bad character’ … If you fail to appear, your name is stricken; if you do 
appear, it is usually stricken just the same.”86  Mississippi followed a 
similar pattern, also looking to moral character as grounds for rejecting 
applications to vote.  This became apparent in 1960, when Mississippi 
state representative Thompson McClellan introduced a resolution 
requiring that voters be “of good moral character” in order to register, a 
measure adopted by the Senate on April 28, 1960, and by the House a few 
days later.87   
 Meanwhile, the Louisiana legislature submitted two constitutional 
amendments to a statewide referendum limiting voting rights to those who 
could establish good moral character.88  According to the statute, those 
who had “lived with another in common law” marriage within five years 
from the date of making application to become an elector,” and those who 
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had “given birth to an illegitimate child within the five years immediately 
prior to the date of making application for registration as an elector did not 
possess good character.”89  The amendments, which were passed on 
November 8, 1960, empowered county registrars to determine whether 
individuals were either in common law marriages or had illegitimate 
children.90 
Not satisfied, Louisiana then punished unwed mothers by denying 
them welfare benefits.  In 1960, the state passed a bill denying welfare 
benefits to an illegitimate child “if the mother of the illegitimate child in 
question is the mother of two or more older illegitimate children.”91 Then, 
the legislature enacted another statute denying public assistance “to any 
person who is living with his or her mother if the mother has had an 
illegitimate child after a check has been received from the welfare 
department.”92  Almost immediately, the new measures “removed over a 
quarter of Louisiana’s ADC recipients from the state’s welfare rolls by 
eliminating the eligibility of 6,000 families with 22,500 children – 95 
percent of whom were African American.”93 
Florida engaged in a similar pogrom. Citing “the pressing problem 
of illegitimacy,” Florida Governor LeRoy Collins recommended that 
welfare be cut to children living in unsuitable homes.94  A home’s 
suitability was determined by a set of vague criteria, each one capable of 
disqualifying the recipient.95  For example, if children were left alone 
while their parents engaged in “social activities or undesirable pursuits,” 
they could lose welfare benefits.96  Also, if parents engaged in 
promiscuous conduct “either in or outside the home” or had an illegitimate 
child after receiving an assistance payment, they could lose support.97  Of 
a total of 14,664 reports on unsuitable homes that were filed because of 
the 1959 restrictions, 91 percent of these reports were filed against black 
families, with the end result that 7,000 families and nearly 30,000 children 
lost welfare funding.98 
 Though draconian, welfare cuts in Florida and Louisiana 
epitomized a larger shift in southern law away from express references to 
color and towards more subtle, manufactured notions of racial character, 
even culture.  North Carolina Governor Luther Hodges admitted as much 
during a televised address on August 8, 1955, when he asserted that 
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African Americans possessed “a new and rapidly developing culture,” 
while whites retained an “older culture,” that threatened to be destroyed 
under integrated conditions.99  “[U]nless we can, through good will and 
pride in the integrity of our respective racial cultures,” argued Hodges, 
“separate schools voluntarily,” then much of the progress made by both 
cultures would be “undone.”100  Though Hodges did not define what, 
precisely, he meant by culture, his words reverberated with claims made 
by other, more extreme segregationists.  To take just a few examples, 
James Jackson Kilpatrick agreed that integration would lead to “the 
decline of the only culture we know,” while Judge Thomas Pickens Brady 
warned that wherever integration was attempted, “the white man, his 
intellect, and his culture have died.”101 Such recurring allusions to culture 
help explain the region-wide emphasis on illegitimacy rates, statistical 
indicators of sexual behavior that segregationists used – even manipulated 
– to prove that race was not simply a matter of cosmetic difference.102  
Rather race could be measured, they argued, by looking at collective 
sexual behavior, what they wanted to assert was in fact customary 
behavior, or culture, thereby generating a color-neutral, moralist discourse 
that both animated – and was animated by – state law.  As the next section 
will illustrate, segregationists carried this discourse to the national stage, 
hoping to build bridges between the South and the nation.   
 
 
 
III. SOCIOLOGICAL WARFARE 
 
Even as southern states enacted increasingly racially-coded moral 
regulations to preserve Jim Crow, so too did segregationists cobble 
together a moralist campaign aimed at stirring resentment to integration 
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nationally.103  Animating this campaign was a conviction that the South’s 
fate hinged on pitching reasonable arguments to the “unprejudiced” minds 
of enough voters in the North and West that Brown might be “effectively 
modified or controlled by acts of Congress.”104  As one of the South 
Carolina attorneys who argued against the NAACP in Brown put it in 
1955, “[o]ur only hope at present lies not in the carrying on of the battle in 
the courts” but rather in taking “the battle to the people and using the same 
psychological and sociological warfare that has been so successfully 
carried on against us.” 105  
One place where segregationists hoped to take the battle to the 
people, or at least their representatives, was Congress.  There, prominent 
Senators like Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland declared that 
southerners had “to go into the North, and carry the fight into every 
section of the United States.”106  “What divides the two areas of our 
country,” posited Eastland, was “that in each area the people think that 
those in the other area do not think as they do, when in reality we all think 
alike.”107  To Eastland’s mind, all Americans possessed trepidation about 
racial integration and – though few would openly endorse racism – most 
could be persuaded to curtail the Supreme Court.  In fact, Eastland 
proposed an amendment to the Constitution in 1954 providing that “there 
shall be preserved to the States full control of health, education, marriage, 
and good order within a State.”108 
Though few joined Eastland’s amendment, other prominent 
southerners echoed his national appeal.  To take just one example, Georgia 
Senator Herman Talmadge took the very same arguments about 
illegitimacy that had been stalking southern legislatures since 1954 to the 
nation in 1959.  On September 1, 1959, Talmadge declared that the 
“mounting rate of illegitimacy” in America was approaching a “national 
disgrace.”109  Carefully tracking southern efforts to cut welfare benefits to 
illegitimate children, Talmadge “proposed that the Senate Committee on 
Finance … undertake a thorough study of the relationship between the 
alarming increase in illegitimacy and Federal policies governing welfare 
assistance to dependent children.”110  He then entered reams of statistics 
into the Congressional Record, documenting expenditures on illegitimate 
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children by the federal government nationwide, including breakdowns of 
those expenditures by race.111 
Even as Talmadge and Eastland waged moral wars in the Senate, 
so too did southerners wage “sociological warfare” in the House.  To take 
just one example, Mississippi Representative John Bell Williams mounted 
a vigorous campaign in 1956 to sway popular opinion against integration 
by focusing on crime statistics.112  In January of that year, Williams 
entered into the Congressional Record evidence indicating that African 
Americans committed five times as many murders as whites in 
Washington DC and seven times as many rapes.113  Though such numbers 
may have been inflated due to demographic shifts like white flight, not to 
mention reporting bias, Williams glossed over scientific explanations for 
his supposedly scientific data, preferring instead to make broad claims 
about black inferiority.  For example, he cited Federal Bureau of Prisons 
data to argue that even though African Americans comprised only “10 
percent” of the population in the United States in 1950, they committed 
“more than half the homicides, both murder and manslaughter, in our 
country.”114  Of course, Williams failed to mention that crimes committed 
by whites, particularly crimes committed by whites in the South, tended to 
go unpunished as evidenced by the murder of black teenager Emmett Till 
in his own state of Mississippi only a year before, in 1955.115 
Desperate to shift popular attention away from the murderous 
tendencies of his own people, Williams organized a study of integrated 
conditions in Washington D.C. schools, hoping to generate more statistics 
on black inferiority.  Using his position on a house subcommittee 
dedicated to investigating delinquency in DC schools, Williams enlisted 
the support of three white southern congressmen to generate a report that 
grossly exaggerated problems related to integration.116  For example, 
Williams began by claiming that there were “very few unusual 
disciplinary problems in either” black or white schools prior to integration, 
only to then conclude that desegregation had resulted in “appalling, 
demoralizing, intolerable, and disgraceful” conditions.”117  Among these 
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conditions were dubiously documented spikes in “fighting, lying, 
stealing,” and “vandalism,” as well as factors that appeared to have little to 
do with whether schools were integrated or segregated, like black 
illegitimacy.118  Vaguely citing “sex problems” the committee asserted 
that “[o]ne out of every four Negro children born in the District of 
Columbia is illegitimate” and “that the number of cases of venereal 
disease among Negroes of school age has been found to be astounding and 
tragic.”119  Providing no real data on how such rates had been tabulated or 
why they were even relevant, Williams moved quickly to the now-
standard segregationist argument that integrated schools would quickly 
lead to interracial sex, a fear that in his words explained “the exodus of the 
white residents of the District of Columbia.”120  Hoping that white flight 
might provide a bridge-issue between whites in the North and South, 
Williams concluded his report by recommending “that racially separate 
public schools be reestablished for the education of white and Negro 
pupils in the District of Columbia, and that such schools be maintained on 
a completely separate and equal basis.”121  
However, two members of the subcommittee, DeWitt Hyde and 
A.L. Miller, refused to sign the final report, pointing to larger problems 
with the way that Williams had marshaled his data.122  “The report seems 
to blame all of the educational deficiencies in our school system entirely 
on the efforts toward integration,” argued the two dissenters, who refused 
to “believe that everything that is wrong with the educational system can 
be blamed on integration.”123  Further, the objectors found methodological 
problems with the way that the committee had conducted its hearings, 
including reliance on “leading questions” and carefully “selected” 
witnesses who ended up providing testimony that “does not appear to be 
well-balanced, or objective, since persons with views not in accord with 
those of the counsel were not given full and fair opportunity to testify.”124 
Though little more than a smear campaign, Williams’s doctored 
report indicates the extent to which segregationists like him went to link 
integration, immorality, and delinquency in the post-Brown era.  Signs that 
such a move held out real advantages for the South emerged in other 
places as well, including the archives of well-respected southern 
moderates like Estes Kefauver.125  A Tennessee Senator who claimed to 
support civil rights, Kefauver nevertheless became deeply interested in the 
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degeneration of children, a subject that he pursued while heading the 
Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency from 1955 to 1957.126  
During his tenure, Kefauver initiated investigations into comic books, 
television, motion pictures, and pornography, all with an eye to “the 
impact of their respective products on juvenile behavior.”127   
Though he never once mentioned race, Kefauver echoed 
arguments made by segregationists like Williams, Talmadge and Eastland 
about the vulnerability of children. In a speech on July 6, 1955, for 
example, he proclaimed that children are “subject to a wide variety of 
influences and conditions which tend to either lessen or increase [their] 
chances of becoming delinquent.”128  Such influences included poor 
family background, particularly parents who suffered from “financial lack, 
health, or emotional handicaps.”129  Kefauver also emphasized the role 
that schools played in child development, noting that they were the “only 
social agency that comes in contact with every child,” and remained 
“second only to the family in being responsible for preparing the child for 
life.”130 
Rather than push for the integration of public schools, however, 
Kefauver focused instead on “exploring ways in which the Federal 
Government can assist the States to strengthen and improve … 
correctional institutions, juvenile detention centers, and juvenile police 
bureaus.”131  Citing problems with funding and staff training, Kefauver 
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articulated a federal role in juvenile justice, one that might be helpful in 
“fortifying and strengthening” delinquency “institutions.”132  This interest 
tracked the attention of other moderates in the South who viewed juvenile 
justice as a critical part of the post-Brown paradigm, both as a means of 
assuaging white fears that integration would damage their children, and as 
a way of dealing with many of the behaviors that segregationists like John 
Bell Williams had highlighted in Washington DC schools.133 
Yet, Kefauver never drew a link between delinquency and 
desegregation.  Why?  One possible explanation is that he enjoyed black 
electoral support, and had been aided significantly by black voters in 
defeating a “Crump machine” candidate in 1948.134  Another related 
possibility is that Kevaufer, like Texas Senator Lyndon Johnson, harbored 
aspirations of even higher office.135  Hoping for the White House, 
Kefauver may have deliberately avoided open discussions of race to 
secure not only black votes, but white votes in the North and West.136  
Continuing along these lines, Kefauver worked carefully – perhaps more 
carefully than others – to align his policy positions with moral campaigns 
that mapped, but did not mention, race.  
For example, during his time as head of the Subcommittee on 
Juvenile Delinquency, Kefauver developed a committed interest in 
fighting the evils of pornography.  In 1955, Kefauver’s Committee made 
“an investigation of pornography and the sale of pornographic literature to 
juvenile delinquents.”137   The Committee then recommended that “the 
shipment of indecent literature in interstate commerce be banned.”138  One 
year later, Kefauver returned to the question of obscenity, this time issuing 
a report entitled “Obscene and Pornographic Literature and Juvenile 
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Delinquency.”139  In his conclusions, Kefauver called for “more stringent 
penalties for violations of laws concerning pornography,” partly because 
“the adolescent age group was the most susceptible to sexual 
deviations.”140 
Just as Kefauver raised the question of obscenity in the national 
arena, so too did Tennessee officials like Memphis film censor Lloyd 
Binford raise the question of obscenity at the local level – using it to ban 
interracial films.141  To take just a few examples, Binford declared Island 
in the Sun, a film starring Harry Belafonte and featuring an interracial 
romance, obscene in 1957.142  Similar controversy exploded over I Spit on 
Your Grave, a film about a “light-skinned black man” who exacts revenge 
for his brother’s lynching by embarking on “multiple affairs with white 
girls,” and the L-Shaped Room, about a “young pregnant white woman” 
who enjoys “unexpected intimacy” with a “lonely [N]egro musician.”143  
While Kefauver may have been motivated to control such films, 
battling pornography provided him with more than simply an excuse for 
suppressing interracial media, it also provided him with a facially-neutral, 
politically viable rationale for joining his southern kinsmen in 
dramatically curtailing the scope and reach of the Supreme Court.  This 
became apparent in 1959, when Kefauver joined James O. Eastland and 
Herman Talmadge, both avid segregationists, in proposing an amendment 
to the United States Constitution.144 Modeled after Eastland’s earlier 
amendment removing power from the Court over questions of education, 
order, and health, the new amendment proved more subtle, declaring 
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simply that the rights of states to “decide on the basis of [their] own public 
policy questions of decency and morality” be not “abridged.”145 
The impetus for the law, according to Talmadge, was not Brown v. 
Board of Education but another Supreme Court decision, Kingsley 
International Picture Corp. v. Regents that declared states could not ban 
films deemed “immoral.”146  The immoral movie in question was Lady 
Chatterly’s Lover, a rendition of the novel by D.H. Lawrence that 
recounted the tale of an English woman committing adultery with a 
gardener.147   To Eastland’s mind, the ruling “struck a mortal blow to the 
power of a State to maintain within its borders minimum standards of 
decency and morality in the content of moving pictures offered for 
exhibition.”148  Of course, the ruling also raised the larger question of state 
regulation of morality generally, a field that had become increasingly 
active since Brown.  Though Eastland, Talmadge, and Kefauver probably 
did not fear that Kingsley jeopardized the South’s increasingly complex 
web of moral regulations on marriage, voting, schools, and public benefits, 
they undoubtedly saw an opportunity to remove such laws from the 
purview of the Supreme Court, guaranteeing a new era of racially-coded 
Jim Crow.  
Further, Kingsley allowed all three southerners – two staunch 
segregationists and one moderate – to re-cast themselves in the role of 
fervent champions of decency, a position that segregationists had worked 
to occupy since Brown was decided in 1954. For example, Eastland 
appropriated the same rhetoric that Kefauver did, declaring Kingsley a 
boon for pornography even though the decision restricted itself to 
questions of morality.149  “Something must be done,” proclaimed Eastland, 
“to protect the children from these purveyors of filth and indecency in 
films, books, magazines, and all other forms of communication media.”150  
Though Kingsley had nothing to do with “purveyors of filth,” Eastland 
found the ruling a convenient excuse for raising the more salient issue of 
“the individual State and local community” being able to “set its standards 
for morality and public decency.”151 
 Talmadge reiterated this point, positing that the amendment 
removing moral regulations from the Court was necessary to combat other 
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opinions as well.  “The Supreme Court is famous for its ultraliberal 
rulings,” lamented the Georgia Senator, “[b]ut freedom, under the Court’s 
interpretation will wreck this Nation more quickly and more completely 
than Kruschev and all his henchmen.  History proves what happens to a 
Nation that loses its moral standards.”152  Moral standards, southern state 
legislatures agreed, pointed the way to a new era of state-enforced racial 
inequality in the South.  Not only were southern states rapidly exchanging 
overtly racist laws for covertly racist moral regulations, but staunch 
segregationists were beginning to intimate that massive resistance itself 
was dead.   
 Indeed, just as Talmadge, Eastland, and Kefauver focused their 
attention on an apparently innocuous amendment concerning morals; so 
too did segregationist James Jackson Kilpatrick become interested in the 
question of obscenity.  Not only did he begin a book on the pornography 
trade – The Smut Peddlers – but he also volunteered to serve on Virginia’s 
state commission to rewrite its obscenity law.  Why?  One possibility, of 
course, is that he arrived independently at the conclusion that pornography 
was a growing threat to the welfare of the nation.  Yet, Kilpatrick’s private 
correspondence hinted at two slightly more subtle rationales.  First, 
Kilpatrick was already beginning to doubt the efficacy of massive 
resistance.  In a letter dated March 12, 1959, he confessed that any law 
designed to thwart Brown which explicitly mentioned segregation or race 
comprised little more than a “sitting duck for the guns of Federal 
judges.”153  Further, any “plan” aimed at preserving segregation, reasoned 
Kilpatrick, “never can succeed at all if it is tied in any way to the 
integration controversy.”154 Here, from the pen of interposition’s architect, 
was a call for subterfuge – just the kind of subterfuge that Eastland’s 
amendment reserving moral regulations to the states represented.  And, 
here was an argument for making an appeal to the nation that might 
actually work.   
Three years earlier, Kilpatrick had held out a similar hope for 
interposition, describing it as a viable theory of constitutional law that had 
nothing, expressly, to do with race.155  Unfortunately for him, few agreed.  
Rather than elevate southern discourse, interposition seemed to have 
corrupted it, giving white extremists more bile to spew at the nation’s 
highest tribunal. By 1959, that bile had sickened America: Little Rock 
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remained a painful memory, the Supreme Court had reaffirmed its judicial 
supremacy, and massive resistance had entered a “thermidorean 
reaction.”156 For Kilpatrick, who had long realized the South’s desperate 
need to appeal to majority voters in the North and West, a new strategy 
was needed, a new slogan that might unite the region with the rest of the 
country, turning back the federal tide.157  Enter pornography.  “I have 
come down pregnant with another book,” wrote Kilpatrick in September 
1959, “a serious, and I hope a thoughtful and a profitable book on the 
obscenity racket.”158  Though he did not mention segregation or race, 
familiar themes began to emerge between the new project and the old. As 
Kilpatrick described it, the “heart and soul” of the pornography trade was 
“not the grown-up sucker,” but “the curious child, the adolescent of 
sixteen or seventeen receptive to a little dirty sex.”159  Citing one of 
Kefauver’s committee reports on juvenile delinquency, Kilpatrick noted 
that the officials questioned by the committee tended to agree “that lewd 
photographs and magazines stimulate latent sexual desires among 
adolescents and tend to trigger serious sex crimes.”160  Conceding that 
concrete data proving obscenity caused delinquency was elusive, 
Kilpatrick nevertheless invoked “common sense,” noting that “[b]etween 
1948 and 1957 juvenile court cases increased by 136 percent while the 
under-seventeen population [increased] by only 27 percent.”161  Then, 
Kilpatrick referred to the Kefauver hearings, particularly testimony of 
Professor of Clinical Psychiatry at Cornell Dr. George W. Henry, who 
agreed that children could “be sexually perverted by looking at, by 
studying, and by dwelling upon photos” that were pornographic.162 
 Kilpatrick’s “common sense” view that obscenity encouraged 
delinquency coincided with the equally common sense view that 
integration encouraged delinquency, marking a tendency to view social 
reform generally through the lens of degeneracy.  Precisely because 
pornography was increasingly considered a national threat to children – as 
Kefauver claimed – Kilpatrick saw in it bridge possibilities, an 
opportunity for communicating southern political positions to the nation, 
much like interposition.  After documenting the myriad harms that 
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pornography caused youth, in other words, Kilpatrick concluded that a 
localized, state-centered approach to the problem of porn made the most 
sense – a position that coincided nicely with opposition to Brown.  Citing 
Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Alberts v. California, he noted that 
“Congress has no substantive power over matters of sexual morality” a 
nod to the myriad moral regulations rapidly spreading through the 
South.163  The only relevant constitutional provisions, he posited, were 
Congressional powers “to establish post roads, to regulate commerce, and 
to control goods imported into the country.”164  To Kilpatrick’s mind, 
none of these were particularly relevant to obscenity, meaning that 
“federal authority” was relatively “attenuated,” and that “the dangers of 
federal censorship in this field are far greater than anything the states may 
do.”165  Instead, he argued, the states should take control.  “The fifty 
states,” argued Kilpatrick, “provide fifty experimental laboratories, in 
which legislative bodies may experiment in different ways with the 
treatment of social problems.”166  Acknowledging that certain states may 
choose to ban material that had literary merit, Kilpatrick took a 
remarkably federalist view.  “If the state of Georgia sought to ban” a 
particular work, he surmised, “the literati of Atlanta could pick up a copy 
in New Orleans or New York, or order it by mail.”167  Presumably, the 
same would be true if “the state of Georgia” chose to assign students to 
schools based on attenuated notions of their moral character.  Once 
reduced to the conscience of the community, segregation might live again. 
 Yet, Kilpatrick remained cautious. Already aware of how sterling 
arguments like interposition could be galloped through the mud, he took a 
conservatively liberal stance on the question of obscenity.  To his mind, a 
second cultural conflict existed in the South, not a struggle between blacks 
and whites, but a “war” as Kilpatrick described it, “between the Philistines 
and the literati.”168  In this war, the Philistines – represented by the likes of 
James Eastland and Herman Talmadge – consistently risked jeopardizing 
the South’s politics by making those politics appear so histrionic that 
voters in the North and West recoiled – just as they had recoiled when 
extremists besmirched the legal theory of interposition.  If the South was 
to truly wage, and win, a new cultural war, believed Kilpatrick, it would 
have to adopt a more educated tone, and acquire a more discerning taste.  
The discriminators, literally, had to become more discriminating.  “It is 
this inability to discriminate, on the part of the Philistines,” wrote 
Kilpatrick in The Smut Peddlers, “that has caused me so much trouble.”169 
“The same unreasoning logic that alphabetizes Tortilla Flat and Turbulent 
Daughters side by side in an NODL list,” he lamented, “sees a work of 
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D.H. Lawrence, a dirty picture from Roy Oakley, and a contraceptive 
device all brought to bar under the same” obscenity law.170 Such failures 
to discriminate, he complained, make “no sense to me.”171 
 To rescue the South’s Philistines from themselves, Kilpatrick 
advanced a moderate obscenity law for Virginia, meanwhile establishing a 
fund for cultural uplift in the state.  Perhaps ironically, he received a 
donation for his fund from Harper Lee, one of the South’s most nationally 
recognized authors.172  Just as Kilpatrick had feared, a local white school 
board had embarrassed itself by banning Lee’s novel To Kill a 
Mockingbird for being “immoral,” the same charge leveled at Lady 
Chatterly’s Lover in Kingsley v. Regents.173 Outraged, Lee sent Kilpatrick 
$10 to enroll the Hanover County, Virginia school board “in any first 
grade of its choice.”174  Rather than an “immoral” celebration of 
integration, lamented Lee, Mockingbird represented “a code of honor” that 
was “the heritage of all Southerners,” an odd formulation given that the 
book had come to be associated with the black struggle for civil rights, not 
southern honor or history.175  Yet, Lee’s invocation of southern honor 
implied that she too was interested in advancing a positive stereotype of 
the white segregationist, a move exemplified by Lee’s lead character 
Atticus Finch, an endearing lawyer who treated blacks with affection and 
respect.176  That Lee enlisted Kilpatrick in a defense of her book 
underscores the manner in which white cultural elites struggled to reframe 
Jim Crow in a positive light, countering negative frames of segregationists 
perpetuated by both white extremists and the civil rights movement.  To 
illustrate just how intensely movement activists and segregationists 
engaged one another on cultural terrain, the next section will recover 
direct exchanges between prominent segregationists like James Jackson 
Kilpatrick and black proponents of civil rights like James Baldwin and 
Martin Luther King, Jr., all over the question of stereotyping.  Out of this 
picture emerges a glimpse of the significance that popular culture played 
in the struggle for civil rights.  . 
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 Lee’s frustration with Virginia extremists – the very whites who 
banned her book in Hanover County – belied a larger struggle that the 
white “literati” would wage in the 1960s to preserve a dignified defense of 
segregation in the South.  As this section will illustrate, the effort to 
advance a culturally positive frame for Jim Crow suffered setbacks by 
white extremists and black activists, including black “literati” who openly 
challenged white claims to cultural supremacy.  To take just a few 
examples, in 1963 black author James Baldwin took on Kilpatrick in an 
anthology commemorating the 100th anniversary of emancipation in 
America, targeting segregationist efforts to advance negative black 
stereotypes. “White people,” charged Baldwin, “will have to ask 
themselves precisely why they found it necessary to invent [negative racial 
stereotypes of African Americans] … meanwhile “[b]lack people will 
have to do something very hard, too, which is to allow the white citizen 
his first awkward steps toward maturity.” 177 – A clear slap in the face to 
Kilpatrick and others who claimed that whites were culturally superior, 
Baldwin’s allusion to white immaturity underscored the manner in which 
black activists sought to invert racial stereotypes – in this case recasting 
African Americans as superior to whites, a point that Baldwin sharpened 
by suggesting blacks cure whites of their psychological shortcomings. 
“We have, indeed,” Baldwin continued, subtly alluding to the 
psychological data in footnote 11 of Brown, “functioned in this country in 
precisely that way for a very long time – we were the first psychiatrists 
here.”178  Baldwin’s reference to blacks as psychiatrists echoed Brown’s 
reliance on psychiatry, even as it underscored a larger point, exemplified 
in the title of his essay, that southern whites suffered psychological 
dysfunction, a “White Problem,” as he put it, that African Americans 
needed to help them with.179  Incensed, Kilpatrick responded to Baldwin’s 
charge, but not before reading Baldwin’s Fire Next Time, which 
deliberately challenged the segregationist claim that blacks suffered from 
lower cultural standards than whites. “White people cannot, in the 
generality,” wrote Baldwin, “be taken as models of how to live.  Rather, 
the white man is himself in sore need of new standards, which will release 
him from his confusion and place him once again in fruitful communion 
with the depths of his own being.”180  Indignant, Kilpatrick confessed to 
being “shocked” that Baldwin did not want to adopt “the white man’s 
cultural, social, religious, or moral values,” Kilpatrick countered briskly 
that neither were whites “interested in adopting the Negro’s cultural, 
social, religious, or moral values,” values that, in Kilpatrick’s prejudiced 
view, had contributed little to Western Civilization since the days of 
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slavery.181  Africa’s “phallic sculptures,” mocked Kilpatrick, “are truly 
very fine phallic sculptures.  Doubtless they are.  The mud huts were the 
strongest mud huts ever contrived … but if true, what then?  Is a mud hut 
a Monticello, a carved root a bust by Rodin?”182   
 Kilpatrick’s invocation of art and architecture to counter Baldwin 
underscores the extent to which debates about culture infused the 
discourse of civil rights in the 1960s.  Direct action protest contributed to 
these debates, often challenging segregationist stereotypes, pressing 
theorists like Kilpatrick to amend – though not surrender – their cultural 
positions.  For example, during the student sit-ins of 1960, Kilpatrick 
conceded that well-dressed, disciplined black college students posed a 
challenge to white stereotypes of black cultural inferiority, even inverting 
them, making whites look backward and uncivilized.  “Many a Virginian 
must have felt a tinge of wry regret,” wrote Kilpatrick in 1960, “in reading 
of Saturday’s ‘sitdowns’ by Negro students in Richmond stores.  Here 
were the colored students, in coats, white shirts, ties and one of them was 
reading Goethe and one was taking notes from a biology text.  And here, 
on the sidewalk outside, was a gang of white boys come to heckle, a 
ragtail rabble, slack-jawed, black-jacketed, grinning fit to kill, and some of 
them, God save the mark, were waving the proud and honored flag of the 
Southern States in the last war fought by gentlemen.  Eheu! It gives one 
pause.”183  Kilpatrick’s disappointment with the poor behavior of white 
hecklers – the very philistines that he and Harper Lee loathed – pointed to 
the manner in which direct action protest inverted racial stereotypes of 
black cultural inferiority.  Black demonstrators deliberately upset such 
stereotypes, purposely remaining non-violent, intentionally embarrassing 
their white counterparts, and, as Kilpatrick noted in Richmond, even 
appropriating elite cultural markers – in this case Goethe – something that 
the white “rabble” eschewed. 
 Aware of the manner in which such protest could either challenge 
or reinforce stereotypes, black activist James Lawson stressed the 
importance of maintaining a particular cultural image to the success of 
direct action protest.  One of the leaders of the student sit-ins in Nashville, 
Lawson advised women who wanted to participate in demonstrations to 
wear stockings and heels, while men should don coats and ties.184  John 
Lewis, who also worked with Lawson, routinely handed out rules of 
engagement to student demonstrators that focused not only on dress, but 
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manners, including directives that students remain courteous, sit straight 
while at the counter, and refrain from cursing.185 
 As black demonstrators deliberately enlisted cultural practice, 
language, dress, and so on, white voices joined Kilpatrick in lamenting the 
precise manner in which the sit-ins exposed white cultural deficiencies.  
“[S]outhern white people are human,” exclaimed Georgia Senator Richard 
Russell on Feb 27, 1960, “[t]hey feel that they are being baited like 
animals … what is more, they feel that they are being baited for political 
purposes … they are sensitive; this is no time to be trying to provoke a 
race riot.”186  Russell’s confession that southern whites were easily baited 
– “like animals” – hinted at an insecurity that gripped elite southerners, an 
insecurity that the white South generally could not, in fact, live up to its 
pretensions of cultural superiority.  If black demonstrators continued 
exposing those pretensions, both Kilpatrick and Russell feared that 
national attitudes towards the region might shift, in favor of civil rights.  “I 
know who will be blamed for it,” claimed Russell in reference to the 
violence that the sit-ins risked provoking from “sensitive” southern whites,  
“I know who will be denounced all over the country.  It will be the white 
people of the South.”187 
 To bolster whitelegitimacy, Russell turned to personal morality, 
underscoring the link between civil rights and sex.  “Why do not the 
newspapers that constantly criticize [the South],” argued Russell, “‘advise 
our Negro friends to do something to improve themselves” including 
“reduce their illegitimacy from 10 times that of the rest of the country to 5 
times.”188 Russell’s charge resonated with arguments made by other 
segregationists, including Citizens’ Council leader Tom Brady that 
“obscenity and depravity” permeated black culture and justified Jim 
Crow.189  Of course, such malevolent portrayals of black life as obscene 
belied segregationists’ own efforts to artificially exaggerate the extent of 
black degeneracy, something that the Mississippi legislature attempted by 
invalidating common law marriage.  Further, segregationist attempts to 
portray black culture as sexually licentious did little to assuage their own 
fears that a majority of whites might in fact be more than happy to mix 
socially and romantically with blacks under integrated conditions.   
Such fears became apparent in 1957, when Twentieth Century Fox 
released a film entitled Island in the Sun about two interracial couples, one 
a black revolutionary on a Caribbean island played by Harry Belafonte 
who finds himself pursued by an elite white woman played by Joan 
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Fontaine, and the other a white suitor who declares his love for black 
actress Dorothy Dandridge.190  Both relationships disturbed segregationists 
in Memphis so much that they declared the film “offensive to moral 
standards” and censored it, a move replicated in other cities across the 
South.191  Of course, such outright declarations of interracial relations as 
obscene violated constitutional law, even as they underscored the manner 
in which obscenity itself became part of a larger discourse on race, rights, 
and sex.    
Picking up on the same discourse that had driven states like 
Mississippi and North Carolina to tinker with illegitimacy rates, for 
example, Richard Russell argued that Congress “should put a stop to this 
business of establishing relief programs that encourage illegitimacy,” even 
as he leveled his guns at civil rights leaders who also happened to be 
ministers, a clear attempt to counter the “moral” message of Martin Luther 
King, Jr., Andrew Young, and others.192  “Why do the Negro preachers 
not do something,” queried Russell, “about unfortunate conditions such as 
I have mentioned?”193  
 Of course, black preachers involved in the civil rights movement 
focused on obtaining civil rights, not reducing out-of-wedlock births – an 
issue that should have had little to do with constitutional rights.  Yet, even 
high-ranking black activists like King recognized the manner in which 
white segregationists would, and did, use questions of sexual culture to 
undermine black constitutional positions.  “When the white man argues 
that segregation should continue because of the Negro’s lagging 
standards,” argued Martin Luther King, Jr., in Stride Toward Freedom, his 
memoir of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, “he fails to see that standards 
lag because of segregation.”194  “The ‘behavior deviants’ within the Negro 
community,” explained King, referring to illegitimacy and crime rates, 
“stem from the economic deprivation, emotional frustration, and social 
isolation which are the inevitable concomitants of segregation.”195  
Despite King’s awareness that differences in standards had little to do with 
innate racial traits, he conceded that the question of standards was so 
linked to the question of legal rights in the South that improving black 
standards – even though they had nothing to do with formal, constitutional 
claims – could in fact have a constitutional effect.  “By improving our 
standards here and now,” wrote King, “we will go a long way toward 
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breaking down the arguments of the segregationist.”196  “[W]e must work 
on two fronts,” asserted King in his Montgomery memoir, “On the one 
hand, we must continue to resist the system of segregation which is the 
basic cause of our lagging standards; on the other hand we must work 
constructively to improve the standards themselves.  There must be a 
rhythmic alteration between attacking the causes and healing the 
effects.”197 
 King’s awareness of the standards/rights link derived directly from 
his experience in Montgomery. In fact, leaders in Montgomery had 
wrestled with the cultural contingency of rights since at least 1955, when 
an African American woman named Claudette Colvin refused to give up 
her seat on a city bus.198  Interested in launching a test case challenging 
Montgomery’s segregated transportation system, local civil rights leaders 
Edgar Daniel (E.D.) Nixon and Jo Ann Robinson considered using Colvin 
as a plaintiff, only to reject the idea once they discovered that she was 
pregnant and single, her own mother confessing that her daughter had 
“done took a tumble.”199 Shortly thereafter, another African American 
woman – Mary Louise Smith – also refused to give up her seat to a white 
on a Montgomery bus, only to be rejected because of her “family 
background,” particularly her father’s alcoholism.200  As E.D. Nixon later 
put it, if reporters came out to interview the Smith family, “we wouldn’t 
have a leg to stand on.”201 
 Cultural considerations pushed movement leaders to advance the 
case of Rosa Parks, a longtime member of the local NAACP, and 
Claudette Colvin’s NAACP Youth Council mentor.202  Unlike Colvin and 
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Smith, Parks had no illegitimate children and nohistory of familial 
alcoholism, a quality that, as irrelevant as it should have been to basic 
citizenship, made her better suited, culturally, to bring a constitutional 
case.203  According to Jo Ann Robinson, “Mrs. Parks had the caliber of 
character we needed to get the city to rally behind us.”204 
 Just as Rosa Parks satisfied the invisible cultural requirements 
needed to claim constitutional rights, so too did the college students that 
participated in the sit-ins of 1960 challenge the cultural presumptions 
bolstering black repression and white supremacy.  “Newspaper and 
television accounts of the sit-ins,” noted black activist James Farmer, 
“suggested a picture which reversed the common stereotypes.  Inside, at 
the lunch counters, sat well-dressed, well-mannered Negro college 
students with their calculus and philosophy books, quietly asking for a cup 
of coffee; outside, crowds of white boys with duck-tail haircuts and leather 
jackets grinned and shuffled their feet and tried to start trouble.”205  That 
hair-styles, clothing, and other distinctly cultural attributes factored into 
the significance of civil rights demonstrations reveals the cultural 
contingency of rights in the 1960s, a subtext rarely acknowledged by 
constitutional scholars of the period. 
 
   
 Yet, Kilpatrick continued to hammer the question of illegitimacy.  
“[T]he rate of illegitimacy among American Negroes creeps steadily,” he 
wrote in1963,, “toward the point at which one of every four Negro babies 
will be born in bastardy.”206  Conceding that “the white man is no paragon 
of virtue,” Kilpatrick maintained that beneath the legalist debate over 
constitutional rights lay a much larger debate over culture and behavior.  
“We are talking of manners,” he posited, “of civility, of sobriety, of 
restraints upon carnality.”207 
 Even as he worked to preserve a link between “carnality” and 
Constitutional Law, so too did Kilpatrick express further outrage at the 
movement’s tactics, particularly its deliberate provocation of white 
violence in places like Greensboro and Birmingham.  This became 
particularly apparent when Kilpatrick read Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 
second memoir, about the Birmingham protest, Why We Can’t Wait.  
“The work should be required reading in every police department in the 
nation,” fumed Kilpatrick, “Here Dr. King spells it out, with impersonal 
detachment, just how these things work: Committees must be organized, 
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and schedules must be arranged of persons to be arrested; the police must 
be provoked into acts of brutality, calculated to look good on television 
(he recalls that his demonstration in Birmingham almost failed two years 
ago, when the police were at first too polite and cheerful).”208  Though 
appalled at the manner in which King had successfully manipulated white 
authorities, Kilpatrick expressed a begrudging admiration for the 
“reverend doctor.”209 “One does not have to admire the techniques of 
Martin Luther King,” he wrote, “to respect his mastery of them.”210  To his 
mind, King possessed “a certain genius in timing, showmanship, publicity 
management, administrative leadership, and the ability to influence the 
opinions of others.”211  Of course, Kilpatrick had himself attempted to 
influence the opinions of others since at least the beginning of his 
interposition campaign in 1956.  Yet, King proved more successful, so 
successful in fact that the Birmingham demonstrations pushed Kilpatrick 
to confess that the white governor of the state, rather than a paragon of 
cultural superiority, was “an idiot.”212   
 Kilpatrick would concede ground again, after the movement staged 
another round of successful demonstrations in Selma, Alabama during the 
spring of 1965.  After months of buildup, black protesters launched a 
march across Selma’s Edmund Pettus Bridge only to be physically stopped 
by Alabama police who, in a well-televised sequence, gassed, clubbed, 
and horse-whipped them back across the Alabama River.213  One week 
later, northern activist Viola Liuzzo was shot by members of the Ku Klux 
Klan, prompting even Kilpatrick to express profound regret.214  “Those of 
us who have lived all our lives in the South, and loved the South 
abidingly” lamented Kilpatrick, “must feel the stain of Alabama like a 
wound … [t]he South has many needs,” he continued, “but perhaps the 
greatest of these is its need to recognize more clearly its membership in 
the American union … They had moral rights and constitutional rights,” 
he wrote of Liuzzo and Reverend James Reeb, also killed by the Klan, 
“And Governor, it was the first duty of State and local government to 
make those rights secure.”215 
   Chastened by philistines in Alabama, Kilpatrick stood by 
helplessly as Congress enacted a robust voting rights bill, a law that would 
ultimately empower the federal government to strike down unreasonable 
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restrictions on voting, including the kinds of restrictions that 
disenfranchised unwed mothers in Georgia and Louisiana.  “[U]nder the 
Constitution,” complained Kilpatrick, “each State clearly has the power 
‘to determine the qualifications of electors,’” a reality that neither 
Congress nor the President seemed interested in upholding, as they 
“trampled” the nation’s founding document “underfoot.”216  Yet, 
Kilpatrick’s whimpers won few listeners. The violence in Selma 
galvanized national opinion against southern recalcitrance, closing the 
curtain on constitutionally strained arguments about racial standards, 
illegitimacy rates, and cultural “shortcomings” – at least for the moment. 
 
 
V. PERFECT AMMUNITION 
 
  Though muted by Selma, segregationist discourses on race and 
culture reemerged later that year, after an unforeseen explosion in 
California.  On August 12, 1965, one week after Lyndon Johnson signed 
the Voting Rights Act into law, the Los Angeles Times reported an 
altercation between an African American male and a Los Angeles police 
officer in the heavily black L.A. neighborhood of Watts.217  The officer, 
while trying to arrest twenty-one year old Marquette Frye for drunk 
driving, also subdued Frye’s mother, triggering sporadic rock-throwing 
and violence.218  By 10:00 p.m. that night, eighty police officers had been 
deployed to cordon off a sixteen block area. Unrest continued through the 
following day as black youth attacked police and passersby, burning cars 
and throwing rocks.219  By nightfall, papers reported crowds of up to 7,000 
in the streets; stores looted and cars burned.  Over three hundred police, 
sheriffs, and highway patrolmen were deployed to quell the disorder as 
fires erupted and firefighters were shot at, leaving entire city blocks 
burning out of control.220  According to one account, “the 150-block 
section of Los Angeles last night took on the appearance of a war zone 
with men crouching in the shadows, streets littered with debris or 
completely torn up, store windows broken and scorched and a pall of 
smoke hanging over the area.”221  Six days, thirty-four deaths, and 4,000 
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arrests after it began, one of the largest riots in American history drew to a 
close.222 
 Stunned, President Johnson appointed former Central Intelligence 
Agency director John McCone to investigate the causes of the unrest.223  
Before McCone had time to issue a report, however, critics pounced.  On 
August 14, 1965, three days after the arrest of Marquette Fry and in the 
middle of the rioting, the Los Angeles Times printed a story asserting that 
the cause of the riots was not police brutality, poor housing, or lack of 
opportunity but a breakdown in the black family.  “The administration,” 
asserted the article, “is redirecting its main focus on racial problems from 
the South to large urban areas as the result of an unpublished Labor 
Department report that blames Negro unrest on the breakdown of the 
Negro family structure.”224  The report to which the Los Angeles Times 
referred was an in-house memo drafted by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the 
Director of the Department of Labor’s Office of Policy Planning and 
Research.225  Apparently unaware of the extensive debate over 
illegitimacy that had simmered in the South since Brown, Moynihan took 
illegitimacy and divorce rates in the North and recast them not as 
symptoms of economic inequality – which black sociologist Franklin 
Frazier claimed they were – but causes of economic inequality.226  “As the 
result of family disorganization,” asserted Moynihan, “a large proportion 
of Negro children and youth have not undergone the socialization which 
only the family can provide … family disorganization has been 
particularly responsible for a large amount of juvenile delinquency and 
adult crime among Negroes,” a point that papers like the Times would use 
to suggest a cause of the riots.227  Further, Moynihan posited that the 
primary source of familial “disorganization” was not racism but “the 
failure of the [black] father to play the role in family life required by 
American society, the mitigation of this problem must await those changes 
in the Negro and American society which will enable the Negro father to 
play the role required of him.”228 
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 Moynihan’s report constituted a dramatic counterpoint to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown, which had argued that segregation 
damaged black youth, not black fathers.  Yet, the Wall Street Journal 
printed an article on August 16, 1965, declaring the Moynihan report to be 
an explanation for the Watts riot.  “Behind the past week’s orgy of Negro 
rioting,” extolled the Journal, “lies a sickness that all the new civil rights 
legislation is powerless to cure in the foreseeable future – the spreading 
disintegration of Negro family life in the big cities of the North and 
West.”229  According to the Journal, “the rioters who by yesterday had 
brought death to 31 people and injuries to another 676 and who had 
burned an estimated $175 million worth of property, including entire 
blocks, in Los Angeles were not protesting any specific civil rights 
grievances.  They were primarily young hoodlums lashing out against 
society … A growing army of such youths is being bred in the Negro 
sections of cities across the country by broken homes, illegitimacy, and 
other social ills that have grown steadily worse in recent decades.”230  The 
Journal’s emphasis on broken homes led directly to the citation of black 
illegitimacy rates.  “The breakdown of family life,” continued the Journal, 
“can be glimpsed in nearly any set of Negro social statistics nationwide …  
In New York City’s Harlem, for instance, where Negro rioting flared for a 
week last year, it’s estimated one of every five Negro children born is 
illegitimate.  An indication of the social evils this breeds: Researchers in 
one Harlem district not long ago found venereal disease running at 2,143 
cases per 100,000 people … Against this background the Los Angeles 
explosion begins to come a bit clearer.  Otherwise it might seem 
inexplicable.”231 
 The Journal’s turn to black illegitimacy rates as a cause of rioting 
proved a haunting parallel to southern discourses on black moral 
shortcomings work-shopped across the South since the 1950s.  Indeed, 
James Jackson Kilpatrick himself had focused on such rates in the 
aftermath of Birmingham in 1963.232  Now, he reentered the debate, this 
time writing for a nationally syndicated column called “A Conservative 
View.” “Say what you will about the South,” proclaimed Kilpatrick, “the 
American Negro has had two generations of reasonable opportunity in the 
un-segregated North and West.  How has he developed the opportunities 
put before him?  In squalor, in apathy, in crime, in cadging off ‘the 
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welfare,’ in dropping out of integrated schools, [and] in breeding swarms 
of children out of wedlock.  This is the sorry record.  And now, in Los 
Angeles, we witness barbarian hordes”233 Once ashamed of white 
delinquents acting out at lunch counters, Kilpatrick rejoiced over blacks 
rioting in Watts.  “Outside the South,” wrote Kilpatrick in September 
1965, “this autumn also sees a changing mood, far more abrupt, much 
easier to read.  The sacking of Los Angeles marked high water in the long 
suffering tolerance of the American people for the criminal excesses of a 
Negro minority.”234   
 Kilpatrick’s mention of a changing mood belied a larger discursive 
convergence, at least within conservative circles, between segregationist 
discourses of race and national explanations for riots.  On August 18, 
1965, for example, conservative columnists Rowland Evans and Robert 
Novak also cited the Moynihan Report.  “Weeks before the Negro ghetto 
of Los Angeles erupted in violence,” wrote Evans and Novak for the New 
York Times, “intense debate over how to handle such racial powder kegs 
was under way deep inside the Johnson administration.”235  The “pivot” of 
this debate, they continued, was the Moynihan Report, “a much 
suppressed, much leaked Labor Department document that strips away 
usual equivocations and exposes the ugly truth about the big-city Negro’s 
plight.”236  Evans and Novak framed the report as something that the 
Johnson administration was reluctant to openly endorse.  “[W]hen 
Moynihan wanted to release the report,” they asserted, “he was stopped by 
his boss, Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz.  In private conversation, 
Wirtz expressed the fear that evidence of Negro illegitimacy would be 
grist for racist propaganda mills.”237   
 The idea that Moynihan’s report might bolster southern critiques of 
black rights was not lost on the White House.  Others within the Johnson 
administration expressed similar views.  Special assistant and counsel to 
the president Harry McPherson recounted an argument with Moynihan 
over possible southern responses.  “I was afraid that it was going to be 
perfect ammunition for the Southerners,” explained McPherson later, “I 
could imagine Holmes Alexander or someone like that writing a mocking 
piece, ‘Aha, I told you so.  They’re all a bunch of bastards and immoral 
people!”238 
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 Despite McPherson’s warnings, Moynihan continued to push his 
report, and the White House went along.  President Lyndon Johnson 
himself referenced black illegitimacy rates during a speech at Howard 
University on June 5, 1965 – penned by Moynihan.239  “Perhaps most 
important,” pronounced Johnson, “is the breakdown of the Negro family 
structure … [o]nly a minority – less than half – of all Negro children reach 
the age of 18 having lived all their lives with both of their parents.  At this 
moment, tonight, little less than two-thirds are at home with both of their 
parents.  Probably a majority of all Negro children receive federally-aided 
public assistance sometime during their childhood.”240  Though Johnson 
claimed that “white America” was partly to blame for the disintegration of 
the black family, some saw a more strategic motive behind his reference to 
illegitimacy rates.241  As Lee Rainwater put it, Johnson’s adoption of 
Moynihan’s report gave him a way to “leap-frog” the civil rights 
movement, to take the moral high ground from blacks and return it to 
whites, providing the administration with a rhetorical tool for countering 
increasingly radical movement demands.242 
 Whether he was aware of segregationist strategy in the South or 
not, Moynihan placed the question of black marital customs, and 
consequently black culture, at the forefront of the national racial debate, 
revivifying Christian defenses of Jim Crow.  Once battered by Selma, 
southern segregationists rallied, joining Moynihan’s chorus on the floor of 
the Senate. “Dear Citizens,” began a letter introduced by South Carolina 
Senator Strom Thurmond into the Congressional Record in the wake of 
the L.A. riots, “No society or nation is stronger than the homes that make 
up that nation or society.  Until every man and woman is willing to stand 
before God and his neighbors and say: ‘We are united ‘til death do us 
part,’ and every parent is willing to say: ‘You are my child until death do 
us part,’ we as a nation will find our Government corrupt.  Democracy, 
values, sharing, and respect for the rights of human beings must be taught 
and learned at home.”243  West Virginia Senator Robert C. Byrd agreed.  
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Lamenting the “5-day orgy of rioting, murder, racial battling, setting fires, 
looting, and wanton destruction of property” in Los Angeles, Byrd stood 
before Congress and called for family planning.244  “[F]amily planning is 
imperative,” he announced, “and civil rights organizations should make 
intensive efforts to promote such.  The high birth rate among low-income 
Negro families simply cannot be overlooked.”245  “Additionally,” 
continued Byrd, “the problem of illegitimacy must be dealt with.  In New 
York City’s Harlem, where Negro rioting flared last year, one out of every 
five Negro children is illegitimate.”246   
 Though Byrd’s tendency to link illegitimacy to riots was not 
particularly surprising for a southerner, more surprising was Moynihan’s 
agreement, months after his report was completed.  “From the wild Irish 
slums of the nineteenth century European seaboard to the riot-torn suburbs 
of Los Angeles,” wrote Moynihan on September 18, three weeks after 
Byrd’s statement before the Senate, “there is one unmistakable lesson in 
American history; a community that allows a large number of men to grow 
up in broken families, dominated by women … that community asks for 
and gets chaos.  Crime, violence, unrest, disorder – most particularly the 
furious, unrestrained lashing out at the whole social structure – that is not 
only to be expected; it is very near inevitable.  And it is richly 
deserved.”247  No longer ignorant of southern claims, Moynihan joined 
them, marking a rare North/South, bipartisan convergence on the question 
of race and culture in the 1960s, a convergence that liberals would fight, 
desperately, to unravel in the courts.  
 Even as Johnson officials like Moynihan joined segregationists in 
targeting illegitimacy as an explanation for urban unrest – more 
sympathetic voices responded, arguing that illegitimates should be 
protected from the “disabilities and moral prejudices” facing them.248  One 
such liberal was Harry Krause, an associate professor of law at the 
University of Illinois, who proposed a Uniform Act on Legitimacy to 
counter state discrepancies – like those that had emerged in the South in 
the 1950s.249  In 1966, Krause joined Jack Greenberg of the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund in a challenge to an illegitimacy rule in Louisiana.  The 
case, styled Levy v. Louisiana, dealt with a claim by five illegitimate 
children demanding compensation for the wrongful death of their unwed 
mother.250  In their brief, NAACP attorneys Greenberg and Leroy Clark 
posited that “classification by the criterion of illegitimacy, which appears 
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to be racially neutral on its face,” was in fact “covert racial 
discrimination.”251  Recognizing that whites possessed ways to hide their 
illegitimate births, Greenberg and Clark confirmed that “a very high 
percentage of white illegitimate children are adopted, thereby achieving 
status under the Wrongful Death Act with regard to their adoptive parents, 
whereas nearly no Negro children find adoptive parents.”252  Consequently 
“95.8 percent of all persons affected by discrimination against 
illegitimates under the statute are Negroes.”253  To make matters worse, 
both Greenberg and Clark recognized that southern states like Louisiana 
and Mississippi had resorted to punitive welfare regulations in the 
aftermath of Brown, including the criminalization of “[c]onceiving and 
giving birth to two or more illegitimate children,” an offense that could 
garner as much as a $1000 fine or a year in jail.254   
 The Supreme Court, led by Justice William O. Douglas, sided with 
the NAACP.255  To deny illegitimates the same benefits that went to those 
with married parents, held the Court, violated equal protection.256  This 
holding, which boldly carved out new law, indicated that the Court was 
beginning to see illegitimacy in the same way that Greenberg did, as the 
next phase in the struggle for civil rights.257  Greenberg made this explicit 
in his brief, which posited that “the psychological effect of the stigma of 
bastardy upon its victim seems entirely comparable to the damaging 
psychological effects upon the victims of racial discrimination,” an 
argument that had formed the basis of the Court’s equal protection claim 
in Brown.258  Here, southern recalcitrance backfired, pushing the Supreme 
Court to create “new doctrine,” particularly in the realm of equal 
protection.259   
 The Court took equal protection even farther in an Alabama case, 
also derived from southern turns to moral regulation.  In King v. Smith, the 
Court struck down “man-in-the-house” rules, measures denying welfare 
benefits to children who lived in the same household as a man not their 
father.260  At the time, “state welfare policies had to be approved by what 
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was then called the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,” an 
agency that traditionally approved man-in-the-house rules because they 
precluded welfare fraud (if a man was in the house, reasoned the 
government, then he could support the family).261  Though eight of nine 
Justices argued that the “applicable statute” prevented denials of funds, 
Douglas rounded out the unanimous vote against the rules, pronouncing 
them a violation of equal protection.262  
 One year later, Thurgood Marshall dealt forthrightly with the 
question of law’s role in regulating morality in Stanley v. Georgia, a 
southern case involving the seizure of pornography in a Georgia man’s 
home, resulting in an arrest for obscenity possession.263  Though the Court 
had confronted a similar fact pattern eight years earlier in Mapp v. Ohio, it 
had avoided the obscenity issue, ruling instead against the police search as 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.264  In Stanley, Marshall took the 
question of pornography head-on, holding that “the mere private 
possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime.”265  
Though obscenity had clearly been divorced from First Amendment 
protections in earlier rulings, Marshall imposed a tenuous distinction, 
noting that [t]he makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions 
favorable to the pursuit of happiness,” therefore protecting the right to 
possess any material, no matter how prurient, in “the privacy of a one’s 
own home.”266 
 Though Marshall did not mention race, he had long chafed at the 
South’s effort to use “morality arguments” against black rights, 
particularly its claims “that Negroes have higher ratios of illegitimacy, 
immorality and venereal disease.”267  Now, he struck directly at the ability 
of southern states to regulate morals, engaging segregationists on the same 
cultural terrain that they had used, through constitutional amendment and 
otherwise, to build national support for curtailing federal judicial power. 
Further, the case involved the pornography collection of a southern white 
plaintiff – a subtle jab at segregationist pretensions of cultural superiority 
mobilized since Brown. 
 Outraged, moralist voices lobbied President Nixon to investigate 
the matter, prompting him to assign a Commission to study the problem of 
obscenity.  In 1970 the President’s “Commission on Obscenity and 
Pornography,” concluded that the Court’s three part test for obscenity, 
including whether material “appears to the ‘prurient’ interest of the 
average person,” “is ‘patently offensive’ in light of ‘community 
standards,’” and “lacks redeeming social value,” did not actually “provide 
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meaningful guidance for law enforcement officials, juries or courts.”268  
Consequently, “distinctions” between “prohibited and permissible 
materials” had become hopelessly confused, leading to “interference with 
the communication of constitutionally protected materials.”269   
 Not quite the repudiation of Stanley that conservatives had hoped, 
Nixon achieved more success by replacing liberals on the Court.  In 1969 
he replaced Earl Warren with Warren Burger, and in 1972 he successfully 
appointed Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William Rehnquist, both conservatives 
with questionable commitments to civil rights.   With Powell and 
Rehnquist on board, the Court took a quick right turn, particularly on 
questions of obscenity.  For example, in a 1973 case styled Miller v. 
California, the new Court ruled that the regulation of obscene materials 
should indeed revert to the states, just as segregationists had long argued.  
“We emphasize,” opined the Court, “that it is not our function to propose 
regulatory schemes for the States.”270  Rather, “community standards” 
should determine whether literature, and for that matter speech, was 
obscene; independent of “national” norms.271  
  While Miller did not overturn Levy or King, it coincided with a 
second ruling that dramatically changed the way the Court perceived race, 
shifting its emphasis away from compensation for past harm and towards a 
new celebration of racial/cultural difference.  Styled Regents v. Bakke, the 
case vindicated a white plaintiff who complained that the University of 
California Davis had rejected his application to medical school in lieu of 
less qualified black applicants who were perceived to be 
“disadvantaged.”272 Holding that “[t]he concept of discrimination is 
susceptible of varying interpretations,” Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. – a 
native of Richmond, Virginia – made the remarkable claim that it was 
impossible to determine whether blacks had suffered any more “societal 
injury” or “societal discrimination” than whites.273  Indeed, whites 
themselves constituted a conglomeration of “various minority groups,” 
argued Powell, including “Celtic Irishmen,” “Austrian resident aliens,” 
and “white Anglo-Saxon Protestants,” many of whom “can lay claim to a 
history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State.”274  
 At first glance absurd, Powell’s re-characterization of whites as an 
assemblage of suffering minorities actually echoed claims that white 
southerners – of whom Powell was one – had long made.275  Indeed, white 
suffering became, as we have scene, the crux of segregationist arguments 
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about integration and culture.276  In a manner that dovetailed nicely with 
these arguments, Powell brokered a compromise that effectively shut the 
door on making “societal discrimination” a constitutional priority, turning 
instead to the cultural frame of diversity as a preferred category of 
constitutional analysis.277  Here, Powell scored points with liberals even as 
he revivified longstanding segregationist claims that blacks and whites 
were fundamentally, culturally, different.278  Not only did blacks possess 
different “ideas,” posited Powell, but they also possessed different 
“mores” a clear allusion to the types of cultural arguments that 
segregationists like James Jackson Kilpatrick had made since the 1950s.279  
Though Powell had disagreed with Kilpatrick’s endorsement of 
interposition in 1956, he canonized the discourse of race and culture in 
1978, a move that was not lost on veterans of civil rights like Thurgood 
Marshall.280  “[I]t is more than a little ironic,” argued Marshall in his 
dissenting opinion in Bakke, “that, after several hundred years of class-
based discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold that a 
class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible.”281  Equating 
Powell’s opinion in Bakke to Plessy v. Ferguson, Marshall lamented that 
“I fear we have come full circle.  After the Civil War … this Court, in … 
Plessy v. Ferguson, destroyed the movement toward complete equality … 
Now, we have this Court again stepping in, this time to stop affirmative 
action programs.”282 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 As Marshall’s dissent in Bakke implies, massive resistance 
comprised only one aspect of the South’s struggle against civil rights in 
the 1950s and 60s.  More insidious was a campaign rooted in notions of 
sexual morality and culture, a struggle that invoked seemingly unrelated 
discursive constructs of family, marriage, illegitimacy, even pornography.  
State regulations of such constructs followed, as public officials struggled 
to perpetuate Jim Crow in facially neutral ways, meanwhile working to 
build a constitutional coalition with moral conservatives in the North and 
West.  Cognizant of such discursive moves, civil rights activists 
responded, deliberately engaging segregationists on explicitly cultural 
terrain, forcing concessions from architects of interposition like James 
Jackson Kilpatrick – who abandoned massive resistance in favor of tacit 
endorsements of black rights.   
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 Yet, even as segregationists jettisoned defiance, so too did they 
intensify discursive invocations of culture to steal the movement’s moral 
high ground.  Hence, by 1960 Kilpatrick had embarked on a crusade 
against pornography which, by 1965, evolved into a full-scale assault on 
the black family – an assault joined by conservatives across the country in 
the aftermath of the Watts riots.  By recovering such discursive moves, we 
catch a glimpse of previously unrecognized “processes of Constitutional 
decision-making,” particularly efforts to restrain the Court by building 
popular conservative coalitions.  Meanwhile, we gain a stark look at the 
fundamental ways in which constitutional rights are themselves culturally 
contingent, dependant on variables that have little to do with legal 
precedent, litigation strategies, or courts.  
 
 
